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ALTERED STANDARDS OF
CARE: NEEDED REFORM FOR
WHEN THE NEXT DISASTER
STRIKES
REBECCA MANSBACH*

Physicians and other health care workers, like many professionals, are
held to a certain standard of care in their practice of medicine.' A breach of
this standard will likely prove a physician was negligent. 2 However, in the
wake of events like Hurricane Katrina and the HINI pandemic, there have
been proposals to change the ordinary standard of care during declared
emergencies. 3 This idea is called "altered standards of care," and suggests
that there should be different standards that health care workers are held to
during an emergency. 4 Broadly, a public health emergency exists when a
health situation's "scale, timing or unpredictability threatens to overwhelm
routine capabilities." 5 There has been significant research into, and creation
of, altered standards of care for volunteers and Good Samaritans who help
during emergency situations. 6 Many of these regulations provide immunity
to these individuals. 7 Nevertheless, there have been scant efforts to
determine what standards of care should apply to private entities, such as
hospitals and health care providers, during declared emergencies. 8
Standards of care are determined under state, not federal law,9 and several
states have actually begun to create statues that provide tort immunity to
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1. See infra PartL.A.
2. See infra Part L.A.

3. See infra Part L.B.
4. See infra Part L.B.
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health care providers.' 0 But, these state statutes never really have been put
into practice, nor do they cover the full issue of altered standards of care. I1
This paper proposes that "altered standards of care" truly contain two
components: tort immunity for health care providers and guidelines on how
these health care providers should allocate scarce resources during declared
emergencies.1 2 There are certain resources that are likely to be limited
during an emergency, including ventilators; oxygen; intensive care unit
beds; health care providers, especially critical care, burn, and
surgical/anesthesia staff, and respiratory therapists; hospitals in general,
specialty medications or intravenous fluids (which include vaccines,
antibiotics, and antivirals); and medical transportation. 13 States should
create specific guidelines regarding how to allocate these resources.
There is currently a lack of sufficient legislation to protect health care
providers-few states have statutes that address altered standards of care, 14
and even if states do address them, they only provide tort immunity and do
not address the second component.' 5 Because of this, complete reform of
immunity statutes protecting providers in the event of an emergency is
needed. Without reform, providers may not be able to provide all the
necessary care when the next disaster strikes. Part I of this paper discusses
the basic standards of care for health care providers and explains why these
standards cannot be used during a declared public health emergency. 16 Part
II discusses the current state of the law and the implications of the current
state statutes.1 7 Next, Part III discusses the ethical questions that arise from
setting the specific altered standards of care guidelines.18
I. STANDARDS: WHY WE CARE?

During every day events, a health care provider owes a fiduciary duty
to his or her patients,1 9 however, as discussed below, this duty changes
once an emergency is declared. 2 0 Before discussing what "altered standards

10. See infra Part I.B.
11. See infra Part II.B.
12. See infra Part I.
13. INST. OF MED., GUIDANCE FOR ESTABLISHING CRISIS STANDARDS OF CARE FOR USE IN

DISASTER SITUATIONS: A LETTER REPORT 60 (2009).
14. See infra Part II.B.
15. See infra Part il.
16. See infra Part 1.
17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra Part III.
19. Michelle H. Lewis et al., The Locality Rule and the Physician's Dilemma: Local Medical
Practices vs the National Standard of Care, 297 JAMA 2633, 2633 (2007).
20. See infra Part LB.
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of care" are and how they apply in declared public health emergencies, it is
necessary to discuss the basic standards of care for health care providers.21
A. Standards of Carefor the Medical Practice
In many professions, members are held to a certain standard of care,
and health care providers are no different. 22 Traditionally, the standard of
care for physicians is to exercise the "degree of care and skill which is
expected of a reasonably competent practitioner in the same class to which
the physician belongs acting in the same or similar circumstances." 23
However, this standard is not defined uniformly throughout the country, 24
and traditionally courts have "allowed the medical profession to set its own
standards of care by defining the standards according to medical custom." 25
There are two approaches that states typically use when setting medical
standards of care: 26 the custom-based approach, which focuses on whether
a physician's actions are "consistent with what other physicians customarily
do under similar circumstances[,]" 2 7 and the normative approach, which
defines the standard as "what a reasonable physician would have done
under the circumstances." 28 Regardless of which approach a state takes, if a
physician does not follow the standard of care, he or she likely will be
found negligent for his or her actions.
Both of the approaches for setting basic medical standards of care
center on treating individual patients and require the "allocation of all
appropriate health and medical resources to improve the health status and/or
save the life of each individual patient." 29 The physician-patient
relationship is a fiduciary relationship of the "highest degree," 30 and
involves "every element of trust, confidence and good faith."3 1 In the
medical practice, the fiduciary duty of a physician runs only to the

21. See infra Part IA.
22. See, e.g., I AM. JUR. 2D Accountants § 13 (2005) (explaining that the standard of care for
accountants is similar to the standard applied to doctors, lawyers, architects, and engineers, and
that the standard requires reasonable care and competence).
23. 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians,Surgeons, and Other Healers § 188 (2002).
24. Lewis et al., supra note 19, at 2633.
25. Id.
26. See id. at 2633-34 (describing the customs-based and normative approaches to defining
physicians' standard of care).
27. Id. at 2633.
28. Id. at 2633-34.
29. HEALTH Sys. RESEARCH, INC., AHRQ PUB. No. 05-0043, ALTERED STANDARDS OF
CARE IN MASS CASUALTY EVENTS 8 (2005) [hereinafter AHRQ], available at
http://www.ahrq.gov/research/altstand/altstand.pdf.
30. Lockett v. Goodill, 430 P.2d 589, 591 (Wash. 1967).
31. Id.
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individual patient 32-the physician is a skilled professional who has
knowledge that the patient does not possess and thus, the relationship is
based on confidence that the physician will act in the best interest of the
individual patient. 3 3
Furthermore, the classic physician-patient relationships, which are
"individual interactions," 34 are viewed through the lens of medical ethics. 3 5
Important issues in the field of medical ethics include "treatment questions,
as well as regulating abuses of power between a powerful individual
(usually a physician) and a vulnerable one (usually the patient)." 3 6 Scholars
say there are four key principles upon which medical ethics relyautonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice.3 7 Autonomy
encompasses the idea that "the patient should remain free from coercion,"
and the physician is "free to choose whom to serve." 38 But most
importantly, autonomy is about self-governance. 3 9 The ethical principle of
nonmaleficence is rooted in the idea of doing no harm to the patient.,40
Beneficence is about "act[ing] in ways that are beneficial for the patient," 4 1
and it implicates principles of providing competent care, respecting rights
of the patient, protecting patient information, and maintaining the centrality
of the physician's responsibility to the patient. 4 2 Lastly, justice in medical
ethics usually "entails respecting individual rights and acting fairly in the
distribution of limited resources to individual patients."4 3
B. Standards of Carefor Public Health Emergencies
Although basic standards are sufficient in the majority of
circumstances, they do not account for situations where there is a
widespread, declared public health emergency-such as events like
September 11th, Hurricane Katrina, or a pandemic flu-where resources

32. See 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians,Surgeons, and Other Healers § 142 (2002) (explaining

the relationship between physician and patient).
33. Id.
34. E.g., Geoffrey R. Swain et al., Preparedness: Medical Ethics Versus Public Health
Ethics, 14 J. PUB. HEALTH MGMT. PRAC. 354,354 (2008).

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id. at 355.

41. Id.
42. Id.

43. Id
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and personnel are scarce. 44 Broadly, a public health emergency occurs
when "health consequences have the potential to overwhelm routine
community capabilities to address them." 45 Thus, altered standards of care
will become an issue when the federal or a state government declares that a
public health emergency exists, and this will occur when a health situation's
"scale, timing or unpredictability threatens to overwhelm routine
capabilities." 46 Without announcing the applicable standards before such
emergencies, it will be difficult to determine (1) during the event how
personnel should respond, (2) after the event what should have been the
custom, and (3) after the event what a reasonable physician would have
done in the unpredictable emergency. 4 7
Altered standards of care for emergency situations can solve this
problem. 48 The phrase "altered standards of care" has been used to describe
"standards that are acceptable when adequate resources are not available to
meet the usual standard of care" furnished by health care providers. 4 9
Instead of honoring the traditional focus on the individual, altered standards
of care shift scarce resources in ways that save the largest number of lives
possible. 50 Following from these altered standards of care is the tort
immunity afforded to health care providers who render assistance during an
emergency.51 Because physicians need to make quick decisions about how
to allocate scarce resources, tort immunity is necessary to shield health care
providers from liability for these decisions. 52 Thus, the term "altered
standards of care" truly has two components-tort immunity 53 and the
specific guidelines on resource allocation that health care providers should
follow during a declared public health emergency. 54
Unlike the typical physician-patient relationship, actions taken by
health care providers in declared public health emergencies are viewed

44. Donna Levin et al., Altered Standards of Care During an Influenza Pandemic: Identifying
Ethical, Legal, and PracticalPrinciples to Guide Decision Making, 3 DISASTER MED. & PUB.
HEALTH PREPAREDNESS S132, S132 (2009).

45. Nelson et al., supra note 5, at S9.
46. Id.
47. See Levin et al., supra note 44, at S132-33(addressing the medical and legal circumstance
that may arise before, during, and after a public health emergency).
48. Id at Sl33.
49. Id.
50. AHRQ, supra note 29, at 8.
51. Levin et al., supra note 44, at S138.
52. See id. at S132-33, S138 (describing the quick decision-making that providers might need
to engage during an emergency and advocating that those providers who abide by the altered
standards of care in making those decisions not be liable for malpractice).
53. Id. at Sl33.
54. See id. (arguing that health care providers in Massachusetts lack standards to guide their
practice during a public health emergency).
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through the lens of public health ethics.5 5 During a declared public health
emergency, the fiduciary duty a physician may have with new patients is
inapplicable-the duty is now to the public in general and is judged by an
altered standard with a goal of saving the most lives. Thus, there is a shift
from autonomy based ethics to utilitarian ethics or public health ethics.5 6
Public health ethics "promot[e] the common good over protecting
individual autonomy." 57 Instead of applying to individual interactions,
public health ethics apply to "institutional actions or population-level
interventions." 58 The four principles of medical ethics discussed above do
not fit well into the framework of public health activity because they focus
on the autonomy of individual patients, providing treatment that does not
harm a specific patient, supplying beneficial treatment to each specific
individual, and justice that respects individual rights. 59 In public health
actions, because so many people are affected, there will always be a
difference of opinion as to what is a coercive, harmful, or beneficial
treatment. 60 Thus, in public health ethics the principles focus on
"interdependence," which "recognize[s] that the health of some often
depends on the health of others;" 6 1 "community trust;" 6 2 "fundamentality,"
which focuses on the "underlying and primary causes of disease as well as
the key requirements for healthy communities;" 63 and "justice." 64 Because
public health ethics take into account these community-based principles,
they are the appropriate framework to use when addressing and planning
responses to "large-scale, catastrophic, or sustained emergency events." 6 5
Because the goal of altered standards of care is to save the most lives,
it must be viewed in the framework of public health ethics, and it must fall
within the broader field of public health. Public health, however, has been a
difficult field to define. 66 Nevertheless, most definitions are in agreement
that that public health is the "health of populations," rather than the "health
55. Swain et al., supra note 34, at 354.
56. Id. at 355-56.
57. Douglas B. White et al., Who Should Receive Life Support During a Public Health
Emergency? Using Ethical Principles to Improve Allocation Decisions, 150 ANNALS INTERNAL

MED. 132, 132 (2009).
58. Swain et al, supra note 34, at 354.
59. Id at 354-55.
60. Id.

61. Id. at 355.
62. Id
63. Id
64. Id While "justice" in the context of traditional medical ethics is focused on individual
rights and fairness in the distribution of resources, the notion of "justice" in public health ethics is
concerned with ensuring population-wide access to the necessary conditions for health. Id.
65. Id. at 357.
66. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS: A READER 2 (Lawrence 0. Gostin ed., Ist ed. 2002).
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of individuals." 6 7 Furthermore, scholars generally acknowledge that "this
goal is reached by a generally high level of health throughout the society,
rather than the best possible health for a few." 68 Based solely on this idea,
altered standards of care fit into the public health field.
The creation of altered standards of care is governed by public health
law and tort law. Public health law is defined as "the study of the legal
powers and duties of the state, in collaboration with its partners. . ., to
ensure the conditions for people to be healthy. . ., and of the limitations on

the power of the state to constrain for the common good the autonomy,
privacy, liberty, proprietary, and other legally protected interests of the
individuals." 69 The goal of public health law is to "pursue the highest
possible level of physical and mental health in the population, consistent
with the values of social justice."70 The creation of professional regulations
for health care providers, which altered standards of care fall under, is one
public health law intervention that can be used to create optimal health in
the population in the event of an emergency. Altered standards of care also
are governed by tort law. Traditionally, if a health care provider breaches
the standard of care and the patient subsequently brings suit for negligence,
the provider may be found negligent and thus, liable. 7 1 However, with
altered standards of care, there is a presumption that a health care provider
will be granted tort immunity for the harmful results of any rendering aid
pursuant to those altered standards. 72
Providing tort immunity to individuals rendering aid in an emergency
is not a new concept. 73 Unlike health care providers and other private
entities, volunteers responding to emergencies already have "extensive
liability protection." 74 This protection extends from Good Samaritan Laws
and the Volunteer Protection Act of 1997,75 which prompted most states to
adopt their own volunteer immunity statutes. 7 6 However, it is unlikely that
most health care providers are captured by these statutes because they likely
67. Id. at 3.
68. Id.

69. LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 4 (2d ed.
2008).
70. Id.
71. See 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians,Surgeons, and Other Healers § 189 (2002) (explaining
that a health care provider has a duty to use reasonable care and skill in diagnosis and treatment
and is liable to individual patients for a failure to exercise the needed skill and care).
72. Levin et al., supra note 44, at S138.
73. See Sharona Hoffman, Responders' Responsibility: Liability and Immunity in Public
Health Emergencies, 96 GEO. L.J. 1913, 1943-44 (2008) (discussing Good Samaritan statues and
the Volunteer Protection Act of 1997).
74. Id. at 1943.
75. 42 U.S.C. §§ 14501-14505 (2006).
76. Hoffman, supra note 73, at 1943-45.
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will be deemed employees of a health care facility, and not just volunteers
or Good Samaritans.77
II. ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW

Several states already have statutes that address the tort immunity
aspect of altered standards of care for health care providers,7 8 however,
states differ greatly in the protection they offer and to whom they offer it. 7 9
There is also a model act that would provide for immunity for private
individuals.8 0 This act is the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act
(Model Act), which was developed by the Centers for Law & the Public's
Health at Johns Hopkins and Georgetown Universities and has been highly
criticized by academics. 8 1 All of these statutes, 82 including the Model
Act, 8 3 only discuss tort liability and immunity and do not discuss the
general issue of appropriate guidelines for the allocation of scarce resources
during a declared public health emergency.
A. The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act
In response to September 11th, the Centers for Law & the Public's
Health at Johns Hopkins and Georgetown Universities sought to create the
Model Act in order to provide an example to states of how to grant
"specific emergency powers to state governors and public health
authorities." 84 The Model Act "requires the development of a
comprehensive plan to provide a coordinated, appropriate response in the
event of a public health emergency." 85 An article outlining the Model Act
states that the act is designed for state legislative consideration because the

77. Id. at 1943-44.

78. See infra Part II.B.
79. See Hoffman, supra note 73, at 1946-50 (discussing health care provider liability laws in
Arizona, Delaware, Hawaii, New Jersey, Wisconsin, Wyoming, Louisiana, Maine, California,
Michigan, and Minnesota).
80. MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT § 804(b) (Ctr. for Law & the Pub.'s
Health 2001).
81. See e.g., George J. Annas, Bioterrorism, Public Health, and Civil Liberties, 346 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1337, 1338-41 (2002) (arguing that the Model Act is flawed because, inter alia, its
grant of authority to respond to attacks or epidemics is too broad and, further, it might not be
prudent to put public health officials in charge of responding to every emergency that might arise);
Matthew McCoy, Autonomy, Consent, and Medical Paternalism: Legal Issues in Medical
Intervention, 14 J. ALTERNATIVE & COMPLEMENTARY MED. 785, 789-90 (2008) (arguing that
the Model Act is far too broad in that it permits public health officials to "take over all health care
functions and facilities in the state") (emphasis in original).
82. See infra Part ll.B.
83. MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT § 804(b).
84. Id pmbl.
85. Id
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"power to act to preserve the public's health is constitutionally reserved
primarily to the states as an exercise of their police powers." 86 Because
states have broader police power than the federal government, they have
more flexibility in legislating this type of statute. Some states, prior to the
Model Act, even had attempted to develop "public health response plans." 7
However, at the time the Model Act was created, many of these state
statutes had either become obsolete or were inconsistent and inadequate.88
The purpose behind the Model Act has been described as providing
"state actors with the powers they need to detect and contain a potentially
catastrophic disease outbreak and, at the same time, protect individual
rights and freedoms." 89 The Model Act's preamble discusses this goal when
it states that the exercise of emergency power is "designed to promote the
common good," 90 but it recognizes that these powers "must respect the
dignity and rights of persons." 9 1 However, scholars have criticized the
Model Act for failing to recognize and respect individual liberties and
rights. 92
The Centers for Law & the Public's Health have created several
versions of the Model Act, and its first iteration was even more highly
criticized. 93 One of the major criticisms was that the Act was too broad and
that it created criminal sanctions that were a consequence of physicians not
rendering aid and citizens not receiving required treatment. 94 In the current
version, there are now only civil penalties for citizens and physicians who
fail to render aid. 95
In regards to altered standards of care, the Model Act provides
immunity for private individuals during declared public health
emergencies96 and specifically, in Section 804(b) the Model Act provides

86. Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: Planningfor
and Response to Bioterrorism and Naturally Occurring Infectious Disease, 288 JAMA 622, 622
(2002).
87. See Id. at 623 (noting that some states had developed bioterrorism response plans prior to
September 11th, the event that served as the impetus for the Model Act).
88. Id. at 623-24.
89. Id at 622.
90. MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT pmbl.

91. Id
92. See supra,note 81 and accompanying text (detailing criticisms of the Model Act).
93. See Daniel S. Reich, Modernizing Local Responses to Public Health Emergencies:
Bioterrorism, Epidemics, and the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, 19 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 379, 382 n.1 1 (2003) (discussing the various drafts of the Model Act). For
criticisms of the original draft, see Annas, supra note 81, at 1338.
94. Annas, supra note 81, at 1338.
95. Id. at 1340.
96. MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT § 804(b).
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broad immunity to a large number of private entities. 9 7 This immunity is
generally given to any private person who shelters individuals, who aids the
state, or who provides assistance of any kind. 9 8 However, in Sections
804(b)(2) and (b)(3), the Model Act provides liability for private
individuals who act with gross negligence or willful misconduct. 9 9 Section
804(b)(1), which addresses the liability of a person that allows others to
take shelter on his or her property during the emergency, does not have a
gross negligence or willful misconduct exception.1 00
If adopted, the Model Act would be a very broad statute because of
how it defines a public health emergency.' 0 Specifically, section 104(m),
defines public health emergency as an "occurrence or imminent threat of an
illness or health condition1 02 that is believed to be caused by" certain events
such as bioterrorism, the appearance of an infectious agent, a natural
disaster, a chemical attack, or a nuclear attack. 103 The event must also pose
a "high probability of any of the following harms:" a large number of
deaths, a large number of serious or long-term disabilities, or widespread
exposure to an infectious or toxic agent that poses risk of future harm. 104
Essentially, the Model Act encompasses most emergency situations,
including events like Hurricane Katrina, pandemic flu, and an anthrax
attack.o

97. Id Section (b)(1) provides tort immunity to private persons who allow the use of their
private property for shelter during the emergency from negligently causing any death or injury;
Section (b)(2) provides civil immunity to any private person and any corporation and its
employees under contract with the state for negligently causing any death or injury except in the
event of gross negligence or willful misconduct; and Section (b)(3) provides tort immunity to any
private person or any corporation and its employees who render assistance at the request of the
State for negligently causing any death or injury except in the event of gross negligence or willful
misconduct. Id.
98. Id.§ 804(b).
99. Id. §§ 804(b)(2)-(3).
100. Id. § 804(b)(1).
101. See id. § 104(m) (defining "public health emergency" as capturing, inter alia, an act of
bioterrorism, a natural disaster, and a chemical attack).
102. Id.
103. Id. The Act specifically states that a "public health emergency is an occurrence or
imminent threat of an illness or health condition that: (1) is believed to be caused by the
following: (i) bioterrorism; (ii) the appearance of a novel or previously controlled or eradicated
infectious agent or biological toxin; (iii) [a naturaldisaster;] (iv) [a chemical attack or accidental
release; or] (v) [a nuclear attack or accident]; and (2) poses a high probability of any of the

following harms: (i) a large number of deaths in the affected population; (ii) a large number of
serious or long-term disabilities in the affected population; or (iii) widespread exposure to an
infectious or toxic agent that poses a significant risk of substantial future harm to a large number
of people in the affected population." Id
104. Id.
105. See id (providing that the Model Act would apply to situations including bioterrorism and
natural disasters).
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In sum, the Model Act provides broad immunity for private entities,
including health care providers 10 6 and hospitals that are likely to render
assistance in a public health emergency pursuant to the State's request.1 07
Although the Model Act provides broad immunity to health care providers
and other private individuals,10 8 it is only a model act-not an enacted law.
However, many states have enacted statues modeled after the Model Act. 109
As of 2006, thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia have passed
sixty-six bills "that include provisions from or closely related to the
Act,"I 10 and twenty-three states have passed bills that are patterned after the
Model Act's Section 804, Immunity for Private Actors. 1 1 It is likely more
states will do so in the future. Though it is only a prototype, the Model Act
clearly has influenced the states that created and passed their own statutes
regarding public health emergencies.
The Model Act also includes several shortcomings. For example, one
of the three subsections of the private liability section of the Model Act (the
subsection that pertains to private individuals who allow use of their
property during an emergency), lacks a provision that would provide
liability for gross negligence and willful misconduct. 112 Private individuals
who allow their property to be used for shelter should be immune from
liability, just like professional actors, unless they act with gross negligence
or willful misconduct. 113 Moreover, the Model Act does not mention
anything about appropriate guidelines for resource allocation for health care
providers during an emergency.1 14
106. The Act defines health care provider in Section 104(e) as "any person or entity who
provides health care services including, but not limited to, hospitals, medical clinics and offices,
special care facilities, medical laboratories, physicians, pharmacists, dentists, physician assistants,
nurse practitioners, registered and other nurses, paramedics, emergency medical or laboratory
technicians, and ambulance and emergency medical workers." Id. § 104(e). Although the term
"health care provider" is not used in Section 804, which provides immunity, the section does
apply to any private individual who renders aid or assistance, a role that health care providers will
likely be taking on in an emergency. Id. § 804(b).
107. Id. § 804(b).
108. Id.
109. THE CTR. FOR LAW AND THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH, THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY
HEALTH POWERS ACT, LEGISLATIVE SURVEILLANCE TABLE 1 (2006) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE
TABLE], available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/ MSEHPA%20Surveillance.pdf
110. Id. Providing more updated information regarding which states have passed these types of
liability statutes is beyond the scope of this paper and discussion.
111. Id. at4.
112. MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT § 804(b)(1).
113. See id. § 804(b) (providing liability for gross negligence and willful misconduct only for
individuals who act in performance of a contract with the State or at the State's request, but not for
those who permits the use of their premises during an emergency).
114. See id. §§ 102-103, 401-405 (detailing the legislative findings and purposes driving the
Model Act and the protocols for a public health emergency, but not providing specific resource
allocation guidance). Section 103(a) provides that one of the Model Act's purposes is to "require
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Critics have argued that by providing broad immunity to health care
providers, the Model Act leaves providers unaccountable for any actions
they may take during a declared emergency, no matter how arbitrary, and
that the act could therefore lead to public mistrust. 1 5 An argument can be
made that if there were only tort immunity, health care providers could
make resource allocation determinations based on any principle they felt
appropriate. For example, health care providers could decide to give
important vaccines only to their family members and friends, and provide
whatever reasoning they choose, because they would not be held
accountable for that action unless it was grossly negligent. However, if
specific guidelines on how scarce resources should be allocated were in
place, health care providers could not just choose to give what resource they
want to whomever they want, because there would be standard protocols in
place. Thus, if the Model Act contained specific resource allocation
methods, which is the second component of altered standards of care, this
would help solve the problem of accountability and public mistrust.
Because the Model Act is so influential, it should encompass all of the
components of altered standards of care, so that when other states follow
suit they will also have comprehensive altered standards of care statutes.
B. Selected State Statutes
Several states have enacted tort immunity statutes for health care
providers or private entities during a public health emergency, but they
greatly vary from state to state on issues of who is afforded protection from
liability, how they receive that immunity, and for what events these
standards arise. 116
1. Maryland: Health Care Provider Liability Under Governor's
Health Emergency Powers
Maryland provides tort immunity to health care providers under the
State's statute that describes the governor's health emergency powers.'117
This statute states "[a] health care provider is immune from civil or criminal
liability if the health care provider acts in good faith and under a

the development of a comprehensive plan to provide for a coordinated, appropriate response in the
event of a public health emergency[,]" but is silent about resource allocation specifically. § 103(a).
Further, section 403(a)(2) directs the governor to "[u]tilize all available resources of the State
government and its political subdivisions, as reasonably necessary to respond to the public health
emergency[,]" but again does not specify how resources should be allocated. § 403(a)(2).
115. E.g., Annas, supra note 81, at 1341.
116. Hoffman, supra note 73, at 1946-50.

117. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY §§ 14-3A-01 to -08 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009) (providing
the governor's health emergency powers).
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catastrophic health emergency proclamation."' 18 A catastrophic health
emergency is defined as a "situation in which extensive loss of life or
serious disability is threatened imminently because of exposure to a deadly
agent."' 19
Maryland's statute is very limited. 120 It only applies to health care
providersl 21 (which includes any health facility such as a hospital)122 and
does not apply to any other private individual who may render aid or
provide shelter, such as private companies who allow the use of their
property for shelters. 123 The statute is also particularly limited as to when
its powers may be invoked-pursuant only to the proclamation of a
catastrophic health emergency,1 24 which is defined as a situation where
extensive illness or death is threatened by exposure to a deadly agent.1 2 5 A
deadly agent is defined as a biological or viral agent such as anthrax or
Ebola, a chemical agent, or radiation, all of which are capable of causing
extensive loss of life or serious disability.126 Thus, this statute can be
applied only in situations such as a bioterrorist attack or perhaps a
pandemic flu that is declared a catastrophic health emergency by the
governor, but not in events similar to Hurricane Katrina or September 11th,
where there were no specific chemical or biological agents, rather just
118. Id. § 14-3A-06.
119. Id § 14-3A-01(b).
120. See Franklin H. Alden, Comment, Liberty or Death: Maryland Improves Upon the Model
State Emergency Health Powers Act, 8 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 185, 188 (2005) (comparing
Maryland's law to the Model Act and noting the ways in which the former is more restrictive of
the broad powers granted to the State during a public health emergency).
121. § 14-3A-06.
122. Id. §14-3A-01(e). This section of the statute defines a health care provider as "(1) a health
care facility as defined in § 19-114(d)(1) of the Health-General Article; (2) a health care
practitioner as defined in § 19-114(e) of the Health-General Article; and (3) an individual licensed
or certified as an emergency medical services provider under § 13-156 of the Education Article."
Id. In the Health-General Article, health care practitioner is defined as "any individual who is
licensed, certified, or otherwise authorized under the Health Occupations Article to provide health
care services." MD CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §19-114(e) (LexisNexis 2009). A health care
facility is defined as a hospital, limited service hospital, a related institution, an ambulatory
surgical facility, rehabilitation inpatient facility, home health agency, hospice, or any other health
institution that requires a certificate of need. Id. § 19-114(d)(1).
123. MD CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 14-3A-06.
124. Id.
125. Id. § 14-3A-01(b). A deadly agent is defined as the following:
(1) anthrax, ebola, plague, smallpox, tularemia, or other bacterial, fungal,
rickettsial, or viral agent, biological toxin, or other biological agent capable
of causing extensive loss of life or serious disability: (2) mustard gas, nerve
gas, or other chemical agent capable of causing extensive loss of life or
serious disability; or (3) radiation at levels capable of causing extensive loss
of life or serious disability.
Id. § 14-3A-01(c)
126. Id. § 14-3A-01(c).
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extensive injury and loss of life due to unpredictable natural or man-made
disasters. 12 7 Furthermore, health care providers' immunity is only available
when there is a specific proclamation by the governor that there is a
catastrophic health emergency. 128 Maryland's statute also only discusses
liability issues and does not provide any guidance for allocating limited
resources during emergencies.129
2. Arizona: Tort Immunity for Individuals Who Take Actions Based on
Government Requirements
Arizona's statute provides immunity to individuals who undertake
actions pursuant to government requirements.1 30 The Arizona statute is in
the Enhanced Surveillance and Public Health Emergencies articlel 31 and
states, "[a] person or health care provider undertaking any activity required
by this article, including reporting, participating in quarantine or isolation
procedures, is immune from civil or criminal liability if the person or health
care provider acted in good faith."1 32 Like Maryland's law, the immunity
provisions in Arizona's statute are very limited1 33 because immunity for
private individuals only applies if the individual is undertaking an action
required by the government.1 34 However, the statute is not limited to any
specific emergency or to any proclamation of an emergency. 135 Arizona's
statute does, however, elaborate that the standard for these individuals is
that they must act in good faith.136 But, the statute does not define "good
faith," or indicate whether a standard of good faith specific to emergency
circumstances might apply.1 37 Arizona's statute also fails to address the
second component of "altered standards of care," namely providing
127. Id. §§ 14-3A-01(b)-(c).
128. Id § 14-3A-06.
129. See id. §§ 14-3A-01 to -08 (detailing health emergency powers, including specific
guidance for isolation and quarantine, but providing no guidance for health resource allocation).
130. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-790(B) (2009).
131. Id. §§ 36-781 to -790.
132. Id. § 36-790(B). Section 36-781(3) directs the reader to the Medical Records article of the
Courts and Civil Proceedings title for the definition of a health care provider. A health care
provider is: "(a) A person who is licensed pursuant to title 32 and who maintains medical records.
(b) A health care institution as defined in § 36-401. (c) An ambulance service as defined in § 362201. (d) A health care services organization licensed pursuant to title 20, chapter 4, article 9." Id.
§ 12-2291(4).
133. Id § 36-790(B). See also Hoffman, supra note 73, at 1946-47 (suggesting that state law
public health emergency liability protections either provide protection for those acting on
government or legal authority or "provid[e] immunity in a much broader set of circumstances,"
and noting that Arizona's law falls into the former category).
134. § 36-790(B).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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guidelines for health care providers to follow when making decisions about
the allocation of scarce resources during an emergency.' 38
3. Michigan: Health Care Provider Immunity Provided for in a
GeneralEmergency Statute
Several states also provide immunity to individuals in statutes that
address a general state of emergency and not a public health emergency. 139
One such state is Michigan, 14 0 where any health care provider who renders
aid during a state of disaster at the express or implied request of the State is
not liable for any injury except if conducted with willful or gross
negligence.141 In Michigan, a disaster is defined as "an occurrence or threat
of widespread or severe damage, injury, or loss of life or property resulting
from a natural or human-made cause," 1 42 and includes events such as
terrorist attacks, natural disasters, epidemics, and civil disorders. 14 3 Though
this statute is broad in the sense that it covers many emergencies, 144
138. See id §§ 36-781 to -790 (governing, inter alia, procedure for patient tracking,
information sharing, and isolation and quarantine during an enhanced surveillance advisory, but
providing no guidance for health resource allocation).
139. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 30.411 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010).
140. Id
141. Id. § 30.411(4) (West Supp. 2010). This section states:
A person licensed to practice medicine or osteopathic medicine and surgery *
* * or a licensed hospital, * * * whether licensed in this or another state or by

the federal government or a branch of the armed forces of the United States,
* * * or an individual listed in subsection (6), who renders services during a
state of disaster declared by the governor and at the express or implied
request of a state official or agency or county or local coordinator or
executive body, is considered an authorized disaster relief worker or facility
and is not liable for an injury sustained by a person by reason of those
services, regardless of how or under what circumstances or by what cause
those injuries are sustained. The immunity granted by this subsection does
not apply in the event of * * * an act or omission that is willful or gross
negligence. If a civil action for malpractice is filed alleging * * * an act or
omission that is willful or gross negligence resulting in injuries, the services
rendered that resulted in those injuries shall be judged according to the
standards required of persons licensed in this state to perform those services.
Id. Section 30.411(6) states that Subsection (4) applies to the following individuals:
(a) Any of the following, if licensed in this or another state or by the federal
government or a branch of the armed forces of the United States: (i) A
registered nurse. (ii) A practical nurse. (iii) A nursing student acting under
the supervision of a licensed nurse. (iv) A dentist. (v) A veterinarian. (vi) A
pharmacist. (vii) A pharmacist intern acting under the supervision of a
licensed pharmacist. (viii) A paramedic. (b) A medical resident undergoing
training in a licensed hospital in this or another state.
Id. § 30.411(6).
142. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 30.402(e) (West 2004).
143. Id.
144. Id.
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liability protection is provided only if the State declares that there is an
emergency or disaster, and if the health care provider acts upon request of
the State. 14 5 Michigan, similar to the other state statutes discussed, does not
address the actual allocation principles that should be used during an
emergency and only implicates the immunity component of "altered
standards of care."l 46
4. Louisiana: Private Liability Established in the Public Health
Emergency Powers Act
Louisiana is an example of a state that modeled private individual tort
immunity in its emergency health powers act147 on the Model Act. 14 8
Similar to the Model Act, Louisiana's is a broad statute that covers a wide
range of individuals 1 4 9 in many different events. 5 0 In its definition of a
public health emergency, Louisiana's statute is broader as to what a
qualifying event entails. 15 1 Not only does a public emergency include a
bioterrorist event 1 5 2 or the appearance of a novel or previously controlled or
eradicated infectious agent or biological toxin,' 5 3 but also any disaster,
including natural disasters (hurricanes, floods, forest fires, etc.) 154 and manmade disasters (nuclear attack, accidental release or chemical attack, civil
disturbances, hostile military action, etc.). 15 5 All of these events must also
have a high probability of a large number of deaths, 156 a large number of
serious or long-term disabilities,15 7 or "widespread exposure to an
infectious or toxic agent that poses a significant risk of substantial future

145. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 30.411(4) (West Supp. 2010).
146. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 30.411 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010).
147. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29:771(B)(2) (2007).
148. Compare id., (providing both state immunity and private liability protections), with
MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT § 804(b) (2001) (containing substantially the
same language as the Louisiana statute).
149. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29:771(B)(2) (providing liability protection for, inter alia,
owners of real estate; private persons; firms, corporations, and their employees and agents; and
health care providers).
150. See id. § 29:762(12) (defining "public health emergency" to include, inter alia, acts of
bioterrorism, natural disasters, and widespread exposure to infection or toxins).
151. Id.
152. Id. § 29:762(12)(a)(i).
153. Id § 29:762(12)(a)(ii).
154. Id. § 29:762(12)(a)(iii).
155. Id.
156. Id. §29:762(12)(b)(i).
157. Id. § 29:762(12)(b)(ii).

2011]

ALTERED STANDARDS OF CARE

225

harm[.]" 5 8 The Model Act requires the same circumstances be present in
order for an event to qualify as a public health emergency.1 59
Like the Model Act, the Louisiana statute provides tort liability
immunity to private individuals who allow their property to be used for
shelter during a state of public health emergency. 160 Louisiana's private
liability statute also includes two provisions that provide for the liability of
those who act pursuant to a government contract or who render aid at the
request of the state.161 However, Louisiana also includes a specific
provision that creates tort immunity for any health care providers that
render aid during a public health emergency unless they act with gross
negligence or willful misconduct. 162 The Model Act contains no similar
provision.1 63 Though it is likely that health care providers would be covered
158. Id. § 29:762(12)(b)(iii).
159. MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT § 104(m) (2001).
160. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29:771(B)(2)(a). This section states:
During a state of public health emergency, any person owning or controlling
real estate or other premises who voluntarily and without compensation
grants a license or privilege, or otherwise permits the designation or use of
the whole or any part or parts of such real estate or premises for the purpose
of sheltering persons, together with that person's successors in interest, if
any, shall not be civilly liable for negligently causing the death of, or injury
to, any person on or about such real estate or premises under such license,
privilege, or other permission, or for negligently causing loss of, or damage
to, the property of such person.
Id
161. Id. §§ 29:771(B)(2)(b), (d). Section (B)(2)(b) states:
During a state of public health emergency, any private person, firm or
corporation and employees and agents of such person, firm or corporation in
the performance of a contract with, and under the direction of the state or its
political subdivisions under the provisions of this Chapter shall not be civilly
liable for causing the death of, or injury to, any person or damage to any
property except in the event of gross negligence or willful misconduct.
Id. §29:771 (B)(2)(b). Similarly,§ 29:771 (B)(2)(d) states:
During a state of public health emergency, any private person, firm or
corporation and employees and agents of such person, firm or corporation,
who renders assistance or advice at the request of the state or its political
subdivisions under the provisions of this Chapter shall not be civilly liable
for causing the death of, or injury to, any person or damage to any property
except in the event of gross negligence or willful misconduct.
Id. §29:771(B)(2)(d).
162. Id. § 29:771(B)(2)(c). This section explicitly states that, "[d]uring a state of public health
emergency, any health care providers shall not be civilly liable for causing the death of, or, injury
to, any person or damage to any property except in the event of gross negligence or willful
misconduct." Id Health care providers are defined as, "a clinic, person, corporation, facility, or
institution which provides health care or professional services by a physician, dentist, registered or
licensed practical nurse, pharmacist, optometrist, podiatrist, chiropractor, physical therapist,
psychologist, or psychiatrist, and any officer, employee, or agent thereof acting in the course and
scope of his service or employment." Id. § 29:762 (4).
163. MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT § 804(b).
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under Section (B)(2)(d) of this statute, which provides immunity to any
individual that renders aid at the request of the state, 164 Section (B)(2)(c)
makes it clear that they will be protected against tort liability in a broader
set of circumstances. 16 5
Louisiana's is a great example of a private liability protection statute
that adequately addresses a public health emergencyl 66-it
provides
immunity to a large number of people who are likely to help in the event an
emergency arisesl 67 with a broad definition of what a public health
emergency really is. 168 However, similar to the Model Act and every other
state statute discussed,1 69 there is no mention of the existence of guidelines
for how to allocate limited resources during an emergency.1 70 In light of
this omission, Louisiana health care providers have begun to discuss and
create guidelines on their own.171 These draft guidelines identify "several
categories of patients. . .who would not be admitted to hospitals when beds
and ventilators are no longer available(J"' 72 and "call for doctors to take off
life support patients thought to have a higher risk of dying to make way for
others with a better prognosis if there are not enough intensive care
resources to go around."1 73
1II. CREATING ALTERED STANDARDS OF CARE AND SPECIFIC
GUIDELINES

State statutes that either provide limited immunity to some private
individuals during some emergencies, or have no liability protection need to

164. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
165. Id. §29:771(B)(2)(c).
166. Id. § 29:771(B)(2).

§ 29:771(B)(2)(d).

167. Id
168. Id §29:762(12).
169. See supra Part II.B.1-ll.B.3.
170. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.

§

29:771(B)(2). Section 764(A) requires The Subcommittee on

Chemical and Biological Terrorism of the Homeland Security Advisory Council to develop a
public health emergency response plan, and directs that the plan be tailored to "include the unique
aspects relevant to a public health emergency or bioterrorism incident." Id. § 764(A)(2). Such plan
must include provisions for, inter alia, "[t]he location, procurement, storage, transportation,
maintenance, and distribution of essential materials, including but not limited to medical supplies,
drugs, vaccines, antidotes, food, shelter, clothing and beds." Id. § 764(A)(2)(a). The provision
does not address or cross-refer to the liability protections for health care providers. Id.
171. Sheri Fink, Louisiana Doctors Working on 'Crisis Standards'for when Medical System is
Overwhelmed, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 27,2009,

http://www.nola.comL/health/index.ssfl2009/12/postI 6.html.
172. Id
173. Id
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be changed.174 Not only must every state provide tort immunity to health
care providers and do so in a consistent manner, but they must also create
specific guidelines for resource allocation during emergencies. This section
gives a general overview of what altered standards of care should be and the
process that is necessary to create these standards.
A. History as an Example and FurtherJustification
Altered standards of care are necessary in order to provide guidance, to
protect health care providers from liability for the potential resource
allocation decisions they are forced to make during an emergency, and to
incentivize health care providers to act during an emergency where they
may be personally affected. 175 The reasons to create altered standards of
care arise not only from the need to provide guidance and protection for
health care providers in the future, 176 but they are also borne out of past
experience. 177
During Hurricane Katrina, many ethical issues arose over the medical
treatment that health care providers gave.1 78 One of the main issues that
arose from Hurricane Katrina is chronicled in a New York Times Magazine
article entitled "The Deadly Choices at Memorial," 1 7 9 which focuses on
how several health care providers made decisions during the days following
Katrina, including deciding to hasten the death of several ill patients.' 8 0 The
health care providers came to these questionable decisions after the hospital
flooded, lost electricity, had no running water, and was running out of
resources. 18 ' The hospital needed to be evacuated, and this had to be done
through the very difficult-to-reach helipad of an adjacent parking garage.182
In order to evacuate, the doctors effectively used a triage system1 8 3 and
decided that the healthiest patients would be the first to evacuate and the
174. See supra Part II (detailing the immunity provisions in several public health emergency
statues and noting criticisms, but generally suggesting that liability protection is essential to an
adequate public health emergency law).
175. Levin et al., supra note 44, at Sl32-33, S137-38.
176. Id. at Sl32.
177. See, e.g., G. Richard Holt, Making Difficult Ethical Decisions in Patient Care During
Natural Disasters and Other Mass Casualty Events, 139 OTOLARYNGOLOGY-HEAD & NECK

SURGERY 181, 181-82 (2008) (describing the unfortunate story of a doctor who provided care
during Hurricane Katrina only to later face criminal charges-including homicide-as a result of
the hard resource allocation decisions the emergency circumstances required her to make).
178. Id.
179. Sheri Fink, The Deadly Choices at Memorial, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 30, 2009, at 28,

availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/30/magazine/30doctors.html?
180. Id.
18 1. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.

r-2&ref-magazine.
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sickest would be the last. 184 Each patient was given a number: 185 those who
were "ones" were "in fairly good health and could sit up or walk[,]" and
were first to be evacuated; 186 "twos" were "those who were sicker and
would need more assistance[;]" 1 87 and those who were "threes" were
"slated to be evacuated last[,]" and were patients who were very ill and
those with do not resuscitate orders. 188 However, as evacuation slowed,
several doctors believed that the remaining "threes" in the hospital would
not survive the evacuation and were left with two options-abandon the
patients or quicken their deaths. 189 Several doctors, including Dr. Anna
Pou, ultimately gave several patients morphine in order to "ease the patients
out of a terrible situation."1 90
The principal doctor involved in the administration of morphine, Dr.
Pou, had charges brought against her, but a Grand Jury ultimately did not
indict her. 19 1 Nevertheless, Dr. Pou has several civil suits for wrongful
death currently pending against her. 192 If, prior to this event, the state had
established some sort of altered standard of care in regards to a triage
system, 193 this doctor who helped for days in a hospital without electricity
and without access to additional resources would likely not be facing civil
liability. 194 Dr. Pou would have been aware of specific triage standards that
were supported by the state, 19 5 and if she had followed them, she might
have remained immune from any sort of liability.
Other ethical issues also will be addressed in several pending
Hurricane Katrina cases claiming that health care providers did not give
adequate care to their patients during the subsequent flooding from the
hurricane. Several of these cases have been brought by plaintiffs who were

184.
18 5.
186.
187.
18 8.
18 9.
190.

Id
Id.
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id

191. Id.
192. Id.

193. See id. (describing the confusion and lack of experience with triage protocol that led Dr.
Pou and her colleagues to take the action they did during Katrina); see also Susan Okie, Dr. Pou
and the Hurricane-Implications for Patient Care During Disasters, 358 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1, 5

(2008) (arguing that Dr. Pou's experience illustrates the need for discussion about the provision of
medical care during a "disaster that strains medical resources").
194. See Okie, supra note 193, at 5 (tracing the current state of the altered standards of care
debate and noting the need to better equip caregivers for "the kind of ordeal that [Dr.] Pou and her
colleagues faced after the deluge").
195. Fink, supra note 171.
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prisoners and nursing home patients during the storm.196 During emergency
situations like Hurricane Katrina, facilities such as prisons and nursing
homes face issues unique to them. For example, nursing homes are likely to
have many patients that are not mobile enough to be evacuated and many
that cannot be left to care for themselves.1 97 In the case of prisons,
prisoners are expected to receive adequate care because they are wards of
the state and should not be abandoned without a way to care for
themselves. 19 8 These cases demonstrate that altered standards of care also
must address the non-traditional situations in which health care is provided.
Thus, before another emergency, states must look to creating standards that
address how medical care will be provided during an emergency in nursing
homes, prisons, or other non-hospital health facilities.
Several other events in recent history explain the need for altered
standards of care. The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)
outbreak exemplifies how a widespread pandemic could affect available
resources. In Toronto, about thirty percent of SARS cases were admitted to
the Intensive Care Unit (ICU), and twenty-five percent were placed on
ventilators. 19 9 In Singapore, ninety-eight percent of SARS patients admitted
to the ICU developed Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome. 2 00
Even in recent months we have seen mass casualty events implicate
the need for altered standards of care-for example, the 2010 earthquake in
Haiti.20 1 When an Israeli field hospital began to treat patients in Haiti, it set

196. See, e.g., August v. Gusman, No. 06-3962, 2009 WL 1212401 (E.D. La. Apr. 30, 2009)
(dismissing the defendants' motion for summary judgment in a case where a prisoner claims that
the prison doctor failed to evacuate the prison in a timely manner, and alleges unsafe conditions of
confinement and that he did not receive proper medical treatment during the storm); Minco v.
Underwriters of Lloyds, London, 997 So. 2d 187 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (dismissing a case filed by
the children of a nursing home resident who died after he was not evacuated during the storm
because the claim was sounded in medical malpractice).
197. See Mineo, 997 So. 2d at 190 (claiming, inter alia, the a nursing home was negligent for
failing to assess a resident's condition and provide needed resources for his care in the wake of
Katrina); see also Anne Hull & Doug Struck, At Nursing Home, Katrina Dealt Only the First
Blow; Nuns Laboredfor Days in Fatal Heat to Get Help for Patients, WASH. POST, Sept. 23,
2005, at Al (describing the distress and disorder wrought by Katrina as nursing home staff were
forced to choose between moving "fragile patients on jammed roadways" or keeping them at the
facility).
198. See August, 2009 WL 1212401, at *4-5 (discussing the conditions under which prison
staff may be found to have violated a prisoner's constitutional right to care); see also Ira P.
Robbins, Lessons from HurricaneKatrina: Prison Emergency Preparednessas a Constitutional
Imperative, 42 MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 4 (2008) (explaining the source of prison officials' legal
obligations to protect prisoners from serious threats and to provide food, water, and medical care).
199. Kirsty Challen et al., Clinical Review: Mass Casualty Triage-Pandemic Influenza and
CriticalCare, II CRITICAL CARE 212, 1-2 (2007).
200. Id. at 2.
201. Ofer Merin et al., The IsraeliFieldHospital in Haiti-EthicalDilemmas in Early Disaster
Response, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. e38(1), e38(l) (2010).
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up an ad hoc triage system and based its decision on whether to treat a
patient on three questions-"how urgent is this patient's condition? Do we
have adequate resources to meet this patient's needs? And assuming we
admit this patient and provide the level of care required, can the patient's
life be saved?" 20 2 Although Haitian earthquake victims benefited from the
Israeli hospital team, it is likely that there will be backlash for the decisions
the team made regarding who to treat and what treatment to provide. Some
of the treatment decisions the Israeli field hospital had to make were
deciding not to treat those who were the worst off so that it could treat those
with a greater chance of rehabilitation. 20 3 Although this particular event
occurred outside of the United States, something similar could happen
within our borders, and if it did, it is necessary to have policies in place
beforehand so there is limited distrust and questioning of decisions made by
health care providers.
History demonstrates that altered standards of care need to be
established prior to an event because in-depth conversations just cannot
occur during an on-going emergency. 204 A state must create an incentive
for health care providers to work during an emergency, 20 5 protect health
care providers from liability that results from rendering aid during an
emergency, and provide guidance for how to allocate scarce resources.
Lawrence Gostin, one of the creators of the Model Act, has even stated that
in creating specific standards for public health emergency, it is necessary to
gain the public's trust and that this should be done by "engag[ing] the
community through meaningful civic dialogue; act[ing] transparently in the
formation and implementation of protocols; ensur[ing] consistency across
hospitals and jurisdictions; and introduce[ing] mechanisms of
accountability." 206 The Institute of Medicine (IOM) has also joined the
discussion on altered standards of care 20 7 and has laid out several visions

202.
203.
204.
205.
already

Id. at e38(2).
Id.
White et al, supra note 57, at 132.
Some argue that this incentive does not need to be created because health providers
feel that they have a duty to provide aid during an emergency like a pandemic. See, e.g.,

Sarah Damery et al., Healthcare Worker's Perceptions of the Duty to Work During an Influenza

Pandemic, 36 J. MED. ETHICS 12, 15-16 (2010). However, health care workers have also stated
that they have a greater priority to their families. Id. at 16. Such sentiment suggests that, during an
emergency, health care providers who feel that their family might be harmed are less likely to feel
that they have a duty to help others. Altered standards of care are thus there to further incentivize
health care providers to render aid.
206. Lawrence 0. Gostin & Dan Hanfling, National Preparedness for a Catastrophic
Emergency: Crisis Standards of Care, 302 JAMA 2365, 2365 (2009).

207. INST. OF MED., supra note 13, at 1. The IOM does not use the term "altered standards of
care;" rather it uses the term "crisis standards of care," which it defines as "a substantial change in
usual healthcare operations and the level of care it is possible to deliver, which is made necessary
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and key elements for the development of state altered standards of care. 2 08
The IOM states that these standards should be fair; have an equitable
process that includes transparency, consistency, proportionality and
accountability; encourage community and provider engagement, education,
and communication; and have the rule of law. 209
Based on these requirements, working groups should contain health
care providers, legal experts, and ethics experts. Once the working group
decides on a draft, it must be distributed to the public so that it has an
opportunity to comment. The draft that is created must allocate resources
equitably and proportionally, and must be triggered by a specific
declaration of a public health emergency by public health authorities in
each state. After these steps are taken, it is likely that a true set of altered
standards of care, which include both tort immunity and specific guidance
on how to act, can be created and be put into place so that the standards
apply to all health care providers who render aid during a declared public
health emergency.
B. Expanding on an Existing Component-ProvidingTort Immunity
The first component that states must provide is tort immunity to a wide
range of private individuals who will either render assistance or provide
shelter during a broadly defined emergency. 210 Following the lead of the
Model State Emergency Health Powers Act and the Louisiana law, each
state must develop a statute 2 11 that covers a broad range of public health
emergencies,212 as well as the private liabilities that arise in many
emergency situations. 2 13 Each state must have a tort immunity provision to
create consistency because the current system is a "patchwork" of
by a pervasive (e.g. pandemic influenza) or catastrophic (e.g. earthquake, hurricane) disaster." Id.
at 3.
208. Id. at 3-5.
209. Id. at 3-4.
210. See id. at 6-7 (recommending that "necessary legal protections" be provided to caregivers
who must act according to altered standards of care during a disaster situation, including
protection that extends to adjustments in scope of practice).
211. These statutes must be legislated on the state, not federal, level. States control public
health laws because the federal government has reserved this right to the states through their
police power. See Gostin et al., supra note 86, at 622 (explaining that the "power to act to preserve
the public's health is constitutionally reserved primarily to the states as an exercise of their police
powers").
212. Id.; MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT § 104(m). The definition for a
public health emergency should include bioterrorism, pandemics, and natural or man-made
disasters. It further should include all events where it is foreseeable that there may be a need to
allocate scarce resources.
213. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29:771(B)(2) (providing liability protection for certain actors
in public health emergency situations); MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT §
804(b) (same).
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statutes. 2 14 At the very least, the tort immunity component for each state
should authorize public health authorities to declare a public health
emergency and should give health care providers 2 15 protection from
liability for all actions taken during these public health emergencies.
However, as Hurricane Katrina demonstrated, there should be some
limitations on the liability protections included in these altered standards of
care laws. 2 16 Most statutes, including the Model Act, provide for such
limitations, 2 17 ,and they are a necessary component for all future
provisions. Many statutes currently provide immunity unless an individual
acts with gross negligence or willful misconduct. 2 18 The Model Act is not a
perfect example, however; it does not create a gross negligence exception
for private individuals who allow their property to be used for shelter.2 19
For any tort immunity afforded to any individual-be it a private
individual, corporation, health care provider, hospital, or volunteer-there
must be an exception to immunity for individuals who act with gross
negligence or willful misconduct. These limitations prevent doctors from
abusing their discretion and choosing to care only for certain patients.
C. The MissingLink-Specific Guidelinesfor Allocation of Scarce
Resources
Although there are currently some statutes that touch on the tort
liability issue of altered standards of care, 220 states' use of these statutes is
likely to provoke criticism related to the broad immunity provided. 22 1
However, this criticism may be reduced if specific guidelines for resource
allocation are provided before the event, 22 2 so that the hard decisions made
by health care providers will not be questioned as frequently, 22 3 and in
order to ensure "optimal functioning of health care systems and upholding

214. INST. OFMED., supra note 13, at 48.
215. The definition of "health care providers" should also be broadly defined. It should include
doctors, nurses, emergency responders, hospitals, nursing homes, hospice, and other nontraditional health care facilities including prisons.
216. See supra Part IlIl.A. (describing the controversial "reverse triage" system put in place by
health care providers working in the midst and aftermath of the storm).
217. See supra Part II. (detailing the immunity provisions of the Model Act and several state
statutes, and noting that gross negligence or willful misconduct will often preclude attachment of
immunity or that good faith is a prerequisite to protection).
218. See supra Part II.B.3-4 (detailing the Michigan and Louisiana laws).
219. MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT § 804(b)(1).
220. See supra Part I.B.
221. See, e.g., Annas, supra note 81, at 1341 (arguing that broad immunity for health care
providers will lead to public mistrust of public health authorities).
222. Levin et al., supra note 44, at S132-33.
223. Id. at Sl32.
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public trust." 224 Furthermore, the IOM has stated that because federal
liability statutes do not exist, state governments should explicitly tie
liability protections for health care providers to specific guidelines for
altered standards of care. 2 25
The following section describes guidelines that could be created at
either the institutional (e.g. hospital) or state level, and addresses the ethical
underpinnings of creating these guidelines. 226 There are specific resources
that are likely to be scarce during a public health emergency. These
resources include ventilators, intensive care unit beds, health care providers
(especially critical care), hospitals in general, specialty medications or
intravenous fluids, and medical transportation. 22 7 Depending on what the
scarce resource is, there should be specific guidelines for how to allocate
that resource depending on the levels at which it is needed (i.e. state-wide
or institution-specific). For example, a ventilator is a particular resource that
is almost always scarce, 22 8 and states are aware of the number of ventilators
that they have. 2 29 However, for other resources such as hospitals beds and
staff, guidelines cannot be created on a state level, but must be regulated at
an individual hospital or regional level within the state.
1. Specific Guidelines for Implementing on the Regional Hospital
Level and the EthicalPrinciples that Follow
Guidelines that are implemented on either the individual hospital or
regional level will pertain to the allocation of scarce resources that are
different depending on one's location, including staff, hospital beds, and
certain medicines. The main issue behind allocating these types of resources
is triage. 2 30 Triage will help decide who will receive certain care-or even
a hospital bed-when there is a limited number of staff compared to
patients. The objective of triage is to "use available medical resources as
effectively and as efficiently as possible," and the traditional rationale has
been strictly utilitarian-do the greatest good for the greatest number. 23 1 As
triage has grown, however, straight utilitarianism has been given less
deference. There are several triage options that focus less on utilitarianism

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
(6th ed.

Id. at S132-33.
INST. OF MED., supra note 13, at 49.
See infra Part III.C.I.
INST. OF MED., supranote 13, at 60.
Id. at 33.
See id. at 60-61 (explaining that ventilators are an example of data that is tracked).
Id. at 65.
TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 279
2009).
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and more on justice and other allocation principles. 23 2 All of those options
are suitable for states to adopt in determining their system of triage during a
declared public health emergency, but, what truly matters is the process the
states use to determine the appropriate method.
Setting aside the specific methods of triage, the IOM states that several
criteria should be met before triage methods can be used.23 3 Thus, before
implementing triage methods after a declaration of a public health
emergency, each hospital or the hospital systems in a specific region must
take certain pre-triage measures including: (1) identifying critically limited
resources; (2) ensuring that the surge capacity 234 has already been
employed; (3) attempting to reuse or adapt resources; and (4) making a
request for necessary resources from health officials. 23 5 Once these are met,
then triage can be employed.
Currently the triage system is not perfect.2 36 For example, one author
states that disaster triage is an "inexact science" 2 37 and is basically a
determination of what "best preserves the 'common good."' 2 38 The author
argues that this "purely utilitarian approach to triage will not be adequate,"
instead a "modified utilitarian approach through the principle of distributive
justice," is the appropriate standard. 23 9 For triage, distributive justice means
that the "benefits and burdens ought to be distributed equitably, that
resources ought to be allocated fairly, and that one ought to act in such a
manner that no one such person or group bears a disproportionate share of
benefits or burdens." 240 A triage system reflecting this idea would instill
trust in the public as it conveys the notion that, although the overall goal
during an emergency is to save the most lives possible, the way health care

232. See infra notes 236-258 and accompanying text.
233. INST. OF MED., supra note 13, at 65.
234. Lavonne M. Adams, Exploring the Concept of Surge Capacity, ONLINE J. ISSUES
NURSING (March 31, 2009), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/7045057. This article defines
surge capacity as "[t]he ability to obtain adequate staff, supplies and equipment, structures and
systems to provide sufficient care to meet immediate needs of an influx of patients following a
large-scale incident or disaster." Id.
235. INST. OF MED., supra note 13, at 65. The IOM also states that the "regional, state, and
federal resource allocation" must be "insufficient to meet demand" and "patient transfer or
resource importation," must "not [be] possible or will occur too late to consider bridging
therapies." Id
236. See, e.g., Fink, supra note 171 (reporting that, despite the "nine well-recognized triage
systems" in existence, there is often confusion and disagreement as to how triage should be
performed in disaster situations).
237. George P. Smith, II, Re-shaping the Common Good in Times of Public Health
Emergencies: Validating Medical Triage, 18 ANNALS HEALTH L. 1, 12 (2009).

238. Id
239. Id. at 14.

240. Id.
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providers will reach that goal would be fair and would not be based on any
sort of discrimination.
Many individuals have also taken more of a multi-framework
approach to triage that takes into account several ethical principles.
Beauchamp and Childress, in their book Principles of Biomedical Ethics,
examine a two-step triage method, which first bases decisions on medical
criteria or "medical utility." 24 1 Their medical utility scheme ranks those
who have "major injuries and will die without immediate help," but will
survive if help is provided, first; "those whose treatment can be delayed
without immediate danger are ranked second;" and people with "minor
injuries are ranked third."2 42 Beauchamp and Childress' second step is that
after "medical utility is roughly equal for eligible patients," methods of
"chance or queuing" can be used.24 3
A more complex approach is supported by the authors of an article
entitled Principlesfor Allocation of Scarce Medical Interventions.2 44 The
authors evaluated existing allocation systems and recommended - their
own. 24 5 The authors promote a multi-ethical approach called the complete
lives system that incorporates five ethical principles: youngest-first,
prognosis, save the most lives, lottery, and instrumental value. 246 This
protocol prioritizes "younger people who have not yet lived a complete life
and will be unlikely to do so without aid."24 7 The complete lives system is a
good example of the type of discussion about the different levels of triage
that needs to take place.
The Persad article's further discussion into allocation principles will
be a useful tool for working groups to include the ethical underpinnings that
are necessarily implicated in the creation of guidelines. One such ethical
principle for creating guidelines is treating people equally, 2 4 8 which
includes allocating resources via a method of triage by lottery, 249 or by a
method called "first-come, first-served." 250 This method alone is unlikely to
achieve the utilitarian goal of saving the most lives: if no medical criteria
are used, it is unlikely that those who could survive with treatment will get
treated. Another system of allocation and triage that could be used is
241. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra231, at 279.
242. Id
243. Id.
244. Govind Persad et al., Principles for Allocation of Scarce Medical Interventions, 373
LANCET 423 (2009).
245. Id. at 423.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 423.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 424.
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favoring the worst off, or prioritarianism, 2 5 1 which either treats those who
are sickest first 252 or youngest first. 253 The final approach, and the one that
is most in accordance with the goal of altered standards of care, is
maximizing total benefits or utilitarianism, 2 54 which triages patients either
with the goal of saving the most lives 255 or with the goal of saving the most
life-years. 2 56 An additional ethical underpinning for triage is "promoting
and rewarding social usefulness ,'"257 which could promote instrumental
value or reciprocity. 25 8 Each hospital or region must discuss these ethical
principles, and decide, based on the resources that are available to it, how it
wants to triage its patients.
Each hospital or region must also create a triage committee that makes
these triage decisions. 259 Each individual health care provider should not
make triage decisions, but instead there should be a small committee
responsible for such determinations. 260 The committee will document each
decision and its justification. 26 1 Having this committee will create more
consistency, accountability, and transparency, and will avoid conflicts of
interests within the triage system-all important elements necessary to
creating altered standards of care.

251. Id
252. Id
253. Id at425.

254. Compare id (explaining triage strategies that aim to save the most lives or "life-years"),
with supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text (defining and describing the concept of altered
standards of care, which has the goal of saving the most lives during a crisis situation).
255. Id.
256. Id. This particular triage system is also referred to as "prognosis allocation," and generally
requires the caregiver to evaluate how many years treatment would add to the life of a person in
need. Id. There are subtle differences in the determinations that might be made under such rubric.
Id. For example, the authors note that "giving a few life-years to many differs from giving many
life-years to a few." Id
257. Id.
258. Id at 426. To illustrate the ethic of "instrumental value," the authors provide the example
of a triage system that would save the lives of persons who work to produce vaccines. Id.
Ostensibly, the calculus is that, because they produce something of great value to society as a
whole-and something especially valuable during certain public health crises-these workers'
lives have more instrumental value. The authors further explain that "[rleciprocity allocation is
backward-looking, rewarding past usefulness or sacrifice. Id. As example, the authors cite those
who have donated organs or who have participated in risky medical research that benefits the
greater good. Id.
259. INST. OF MED., supra note 13, at 80.
260. Id.
261. Id.
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2. Specific Guidelines for Implementing on the State Level and the
Ethical Principlesthat Follow
Ventilators are a resource that will become extremely scarce in a
situation where there is a pandemic flu or some other widespread illness
that affects respiration. 2 62 Several states have already created ventilator
policies; 26 3 however, each state must do so and must tie these specific
guidelines to the tort immunity given to health care providers.
An excellent example of how to create a ventilator policy and how to
use ethical principles to underpin the ventilator policy can be seen in New
York. 264 New York's draft guidelines included several "ethically
acceptable" 26 5 protocols for allocating ventilators in a declared public
health emergency, including: "pretriage requirements," 26 6 "patient
categones,"267 "acute versus chronic care facilities,"268 "clinical
evaluation," 269 "triage decision makers," 27 0 "palliative care,, 2 7 1 "review of
triage decisions,"272 and "communication." 273

262. HEALTH Sys. RESEARCH, INC., AHRQ PUB. NO. 07-0001, MASS MEDICAL CARE WITH
SCARCE RESOURCES: A COMMUNITY PLANNING GUIDE 55 (Sally J. Phillips & Ann Knebel eds.,
2007), available at http://www.ahrq.gov/research/ mce/mceguide.pdf.
263. See, e.g., Tia Powell et al., Allocation of Ventilators in a Public Health Disaster, 2
DISASTER MED. & PUB. HEALTH PREPAREDNESS 20, 20 (2008) (describing and discussing New
York's ventilator allocation plan); INST. OF MED., supra note 13, at 27 (noting that New York and
California have both developed policy around ventilator allocation).
264. Powell et al., supra note 263, at 20.
265. Id. at 21.
266. Id. at 22. This requirement states that "[b]efore rationing procedures are implemented,
facilities should institute all available means of creating surge capacity. Hospitals should limit the
noncritical use of ventilators, and elective procedures should be canceled and/or postponed." Id.
267. Id. This protocol states that all patients that are in critical condition, and not only those
affected by the pandemic, should have access to ventilators. Id. Patients should be "assessed on
medical/clinical factors alone, regardless of their work role." Id.
268. Id. This guideline suggests that only those in acute care facilities should be assessed
using these standards; those in chronic care facilities should not be subjected to the same criteria.
Id
269. Id. at 23. For purposes of assessing who should receive care, the clinical evaluation
proposed is based on the Ontario Health Plan for an Influenza Pandemic and on a sequential organ
failure assessment (SOFA). Id. These assessments include exclusion criteria, an initial assessment,
and time trials. Id at 23-24.
270. Id. at 24. This requires that there be a triage officer that makes these decisions and
calculates the SOFA score. Id.
271. Id This protocol states that if a patient is extubated based on the pre-determined triage
criteria, health care providers "should follow existing facility protocols for withdrawing and
withholding life-sustaining care and for providing palliative care." Id.
272. Id at 24-25. This protocol provides for the review of triage decisions, and states that there
must be a review process that would "ensure that standards are followed consistently and correctly
and would present an opportunity for correcting the draft guidelines or their implementation as
needed." Id.
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New York's guidelines focus mainly on the clinical criteria used to
assess who can access a ventilator and base access on the sequential organ
failure assessment (SOFA). 2 7 4 This is a clear medical assessment that is
easily performed and can help health care providers make this decision. 2 75
However, some have argued that this criterion is an insufficient metric on
which to base ventilator guidelines. 2 76 Professor Gostin has stated that
SOFA "was not designed as [a] prospective predictor of survival and should
not be used as the sole criterion for evaluation." 2 77 Furthermore, recent
examination of an exercise that tested the number of ventilators that would
be available in an emergency situation, as well as how the region would
make decisions if there were not enough ventilators, revealed that
guidelines for ventilators in the particular region should take a three tier
approach. 2 78 Each tier articulates categories of patients who should not
receive ventilators, and includes the possibility of using the SOFA score. 27 9
States creating ventilator guidelines should follow a similar procedure
to New York, but should additionally evaluate independently what medical
criteria are best to use. It is likely that the SOFA score alone will not be
sufficient. Providing these guidelines before a public health emergency
arises will help health care providers make the important decisions that will
be necessary and generate public trust that decisions will be made pursuant
to specific protocols.
IV. CONCLUSION

The current immunity statutes are good stepping stones in the overall
process of reform for emergency preparedness. However, most of the
statutes are not broad enough to cover all possible events that may arise, or
do not provide immunity to all private individuals that might render aid or
provide shelter; most states do not even have statutes that cover the
issue. 2 80 Furthermore, these state statutes only discuss tort immunity and do

273. Id. at 25. This last requirement provides there must be communication between health
care providers, patients, and health officials. Id
274. Id. at 23.
275. See id. (suggesting that, despite its imperfections, the SOFA method is the best available
triage system for an influenza pandemic because the system is based in "objective measures of
function").
276. See, e.g., Gostin & Hanfling, supra note 206, at 2366 (arguing that, because the SOFA
method alone is does not adequately or accurately predict survival, it should not be the only
criterion in a triage assessment).
277. Id.
278. John L. Hick & Daniel T. O'Laughlin, Concept of Operations for Triage of Mechanical
Ventilation in an Epidemic, 13 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 223, 224-226 (2006).

279. Id. at 226 & tbl.4.
280. See supra Part1l.
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not discuss the second component of "altered standards of care"-specific
resource allocation guidelines that health care providers will follow in the
event that an emergency arises. 28 1 Because of this, there must be complete
reform of immunity statutes protecting providers in the event of an
emergency in order for health care providers to actually take on rendering
aid and do so effectively in the event that another disaster strikes.

281. See supra Part II.

